T. Val Christiansen v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Company : Brief of Defendants-Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1978
T. Val Christiansen v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Company :
Brief of Defendants-Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Cohne, Rappaport; Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants;
McKay, Burton, Thurman & Condie; Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Christiansen v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., No. 15751 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1222
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---------------------------------------------------------------
T. VAL CHRISTIANSEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH-IDAHO SUGAR COMPANY, 
a corporation, and UNION 
PACIFIC RAILROAD, a 
corporation, 
Case No. ll'7TU 
Defendants-Respondents. 
-----------------------------------------------~-_..,."'!"ll!I,... 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPON~-
Appeal from the Summary Judgment qif ~; 
Fourth District Court for Utah C~' --
Honorable J. Robert Bulh>cll: .. ' 
CORNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
920 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
McKAY. B tm1." 
500 Kennecott 
Salt Lake City.,_ 
Attorneys for 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-------------------- --------------------------
---------------------
T. VAL CHRISTIANSEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH-IDAHO SUGAR COMPANY, 
a corporation, and UNION 
PACIFIC RAILROAD, a 
corporation, 
Case No. 15751 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
Appeal from the Summary Judgment of the 
Fourth District Court for Utah County 
Honorable J. Robert Bullock 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
920 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
McKAY, BURTON, THURMAN & CONDIE 
500 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF POINTS. 
NATURE OF THE CASE •• 
DISPOSITION IN DISTRICT COURT. , , 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I - Plaintiff-Appellant's Cause of Action is barred by the 
statute of limitations because it is for a liability 
created by the statutes of this state, and the three-
year statute of limitations set forth in Section 78-12-
Page 
iii 
1 
1 
1 
2 
26, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, applies. 5 
POINT II - Even if the Six-year statute of limitations applies, 
Plaintiff-Appellant's cause of action is barred because 
more than six years expired between the date any cause 
of action accrued in the Plaintiff-Appellant and the date 
the action thereon was commenced. • • • • • • • • • 7 
POINT III - The Fourth District Court properly dismissed the 
action as Plaintiff was never evicted. 19 
CONCLUSION • , • • • • • . • . • • • • • • • • • • 22 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Anderson v. Larson, 177 Minn. 606, 225 N. W. 902 (1929) 
Bernklau v. Stephens, 150 Colo. 187, 371P.2d 765, (1962). 
Creason v. Peterson, 24 Utah 2d 305, 470 P 2d. 403 (1970). 
East Canyon Land and Stock Company v. Davis and Weber Counties 
Canal Company, 65 Utah 560, 238 P. 280 (1925) • • • • • · · • • • 
(i) 
10 
9 
9, 10, 
20,21 
15, 16, 
19 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Faller v. Davis, 30 Okl. 56, 118 P. 382 (1911) ••• 10, 21 
Pacific Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Rohn, 101 Utah 335, 121 P 2d 
635 (1942) • • • . • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • 18 
Post v. Campau, 42 Mich. 90, 3 N. W. 272, 275 (1879) 12 
Ruthrauff v. Silver King Western Min, & Mill. Co., 95 Utah 
279, 80 p 2d 338 (1938) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 14 
Soderberg v. Holt, 86 Utah 485, 46 P 2d. 428 (1935) 7,11, 
12, 13, 
14 
Tallmadge v. Wallis, 25 Wend. (N.Y.) 115 . • • • • 16 
Van Cott v. Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 226 P. 460 (1924). • 15,16, 
18, 19 
Wilder v. Wilhite, 190 Kan. 564, 376 P. 2d 797 (1962) 17, 21 
ST AT UT ES CITED 
57-1-12 u.c.A. 1953 as amended .••• 5, 8 
78-12-26 (4), U.C,A. 1953 as amended 6 
(ii) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I - Plaintiff-Appellant's Cause of Action is barred by the 
statute of limitations because it is for a liability created by the statutes of 
this state, and the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Section 78-
12-26, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, applies. 
POINT II - Even if the Six-year statute of limitations applies, 
Plaintiff-Appellant's cause of action is barred because more than six years 
expired between the date any cause of action accrued in the Plaintiff-
Appellant and the date the action thereon was commenced. 
POINT III - The Fourth District Court properly dismissed the action 
as Plaintiff was never evicted. 
(iii) Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
T. VAL CHRISTIANSEN, 
Plain tiff-A ppe llan t, 
vs. 
UT AH-IDAHO SUGAR COMP ANY, 
a corporation, and UNION 
PACIFIC RAILROAD, a 
corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 15751 
-~-----------------------------------------------------------------
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This was an action for damages for the alleged breach of the 
covenants under a Special Warranty Deed. 
DISPOSITION IN DISTRICT COURT 
The Defendant-Respondent Utah-Idaho Sugar Company (hereafter 
referred to as Defendant-Respondent) moved to dismiss the action. This 
Motion to Dismiss was treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment of No 
Cause of Action. The District Court granted said Motion, and Plaintiff-
Appellant appealed the judgment of the District Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of the 
District Court. 
-1-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about June 8, 1945, the Plaintiff-Appellant purchased from 
the Defendant-Respondent a parcel of real property situated in Utah County, 
State of Utah, by Special Warranty Deed. (Affidavit of Plaintiff dated 
August 5, 1977, paragraph 5). The total purchase price of the parcel was 
$700.00, which represented the fair market value of the property. (Affi-
davit of John Wunderli, (hereafter Wunderli Affidavit), dated January 6, 
1978, paragraphs 3 and 14, Deposition of Plaintiff dated March 14, 1977, 
page 15, lines 1 through 4,) The Defendant-Respondent provided the 
Plaintiff in 1945 with an abstract of title, which abstract did not indicate 
th-:_existence of any ~nt on the property in favor of the Defendant 
Union Pacific Railroad Com an Affidavit of Plaintiff dated August 5, 
'~ 
1977, paragraph 10, Wunderli Affidavit dated January 6, 1978, paragraph 
5.) 
Following his purchase of said property, Plaintiff-Appellant 
mortgaged the property on several occasions for varying amounts of money. 
(Wunderli Affidavit dated January 6, 1978, paragraph 5,) The last said 
mortgage was given in 1965 to Dean Terry and Vilate Terry, his wife. 
(Wunderli Affidavit dated January 6, 1978, paragraph 10, 5.) 
On August 25, 1916, the Defendant-Respondent had given an easement 
to the San Pedro, Los Angeles, and Salt Lake Railroad Company Corporation 
for purposes of a spur railroad track. (Wunderli Affidavit dated January 
6, 1978, paragraph 6.) This easement was subsequently acquired by the 
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Defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company. Because of an inadequate 
description of the easement in the original deed, the location of the easemer 
is not ascertainable in the records of the Utah County Recorder's Office, , 
(Wunderli Affidavit, dated January 6, 1978, paragraph 6.) 
On September 16, 1956, Plaintiff-Appellant leased from the Los 
Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad a triangular piece of property adjoining the 
subject property on the south. There was attached to that lease as Exhibit 
A a plat showing the property leased. On that plat there is shown a spur 
track number 6 which parallels and bounds the east boundary line of the 
subject property. Shown to the west on the plat outline is a double line in 
the middle of which appear the words "spur track (abandoned)." Since 
September 16, 1946, up to the present time, Plaintiff-Appellant has been 
aware of the fact that there was an easement which was designated as 
abandoned by the railroad extending through the subject property. 
(Wunderli Affidavit dated January 6, 1978, paragraph 7.) Plaintiff had 
knowledge at the time of his purchase that there had been a spur track local1 
on the property. (Wunderli Affidavit dated January 6, 1978, paragraph 11.I 
Plaintiff-Appellant has never been evicted from the subject property 
by reason of the purported spur track easement in favor of the railroad. 
(Wunderli Affidavit dated January 6, 1978, paragraph 8.) In fact, in or 
about 1948, Plaintiff-Appellant caused a large building to be constructed 
directly over the purported easement. (Wunderli Affidavit, dated January 
6, 1978, paragraph 9, Plaintiff's Affidavit dated August 5, 1977, paragraph Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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7.) The railroad at no time has ever complained or made any issue about 
Plaintiff-Appellant's use of the property, nor has it ever asserted any 
rights in connection with the spur track easement. (Wunderli Affidavit 
dated January 6, 1978, paragraph 9.) 
In 1970 and 1971, Plaintiff-Appellant suffered a major setback in 
the operation of his business due to the theft of equipment. (Deposition of 
Plaintiff dated March 14, 1977, p. 32, lines 21 and 22.) This led to the 
failure of his business, and in the years 1971 through 1975, Plaintiff-
Appellant had no income. (Deposition of Plaintiff dated March 14, 1977, p. 
32 lines 12-20.) 
Plaintiff-Appellant claims that on March 13, 1973, he learned of 
the purported railroad spur easement for the first time. (Plaintiff's 
Affidavit dated August 5, 1977, paragraph 6.) However, in Plaintiff's 
Affidavit, paragraph 13, Plaintiff-Appellant states of a conversation with 
Defendant's Mr. Bigler on May 6, 1971, with respect to the spur track 
easement. He entered into negotiations with the Defendant Union Pacific 
Railroad Company to obtain a quit claim deed for the easement upon his 
payment to the railroad of $100. 00. (Plaintiff's Affidavit dated August 5, 
1977, paragraph 15), but this transaction was never completed. (Plaintiff's 
Affidavit dated August 5, 1977, paragraph 20.) 
Due to the failure of his business, Plaintiff was unable to make the 
mortgage payments on the subject property (Wunderli Affidavit dated January 
6, 1978, paragraph 12), and on March 10, 1975, Dean Terry and Vilate 
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Terry, holders of the mortgage, obtained a judgment and decree of 
foreclosure of the mortgage. The property was sold at public auction and 
the Plaintiff-Appellant failed to redeem the property. (Wunderli Affidavit 
dated January 6, 1978, paragraph 10.) 
At no time prior to the filing of this action did Plaintiff-Appellant 
ask said Defendant-Respondent to remedy and secure a release of the 
easement. (Deposition of Plaintiff, dated March 14, 1977, p. 33 lines 
12-24, p. 73 line 10 through p. 75 line 16; Wunderli Affidavit dated 
January 6, 1978, paragraph 13.) Instead, after Plaintiff-Appellant's 
mortgage was foreclosed for failure to make mortgage payments as 
required, he filed this action against the Defendant-Respondent to recover 
damages in excess of $400, 000. 00 he allegedly suffered as a result of the 
abandoned easement. (Prayer of Amended Complaint.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 1S CA USE OF ACTION IS BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BECAUSE IT IS FOR A LIABILITY CREATED 
BY THE STATUTES OF THIS STATE, AND THE THREE-YEAR STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS SET FORTH IN SECTION 78-12-26, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, APPLIES. 
This is an action to charge Defendant-Respondent with liability for 
breach of the covenants of title. Covenants of title applicable in Utah are 
set forth in § 57-1-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and 
accordingly, Plaintiff-Appellant's Cause of Action is for a liability created 
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by the statutes of this state. Section 78-12-26 (4), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, provides that 
An action for a liability created by the statutes of 
this state, other than a penalty or forfeiture under 
the laws of this state, except where in special 
cases a different limitation is prescribed by the 
statutes of this state •• 
must be brought within three years. Actions on covenants of title are not 
a "special case" in which a different statute of limitations is prescribed by 
statute, and the general provision set forth above should apply. Plaintiff-
Appellant contends that the six-year statute of limitations for liabilities 
founded upon a written instrument should apply. Such a view overlooks the 
fact that the writing involved in this case does not set forth any of the 
specific warranties found in the statute. It merely contains a covenant 
that grantor "has not done or committed any act or thing whereby the said 
premises now are or at any time hereafter shall be impeached, charged, 
or encumbered in any manner whatsoever." (Special Warranty Deed from 
Defendant-Respondent to Plaintiff-Appellant dated June 8, 1945,) Only by 
referring to the statute may the five specific covenants referred to in 
Plaintiff-Appellant's brief be found. Plaintiff-Appellant's claim is founded 
on the statute, not on the writing, and the shorter statute of limitations 
should apply. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has applied the six-year statute 
of limitations to a case involving breach of covenants of title, there is no 
indication in that opinion that the issue of the applicable statute of 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-7-
limitations was ever raised. Soderberg v. Holt, 86 Utah 485, 46 p 2d. 4n 
( 1935). Since actions on covenants of title in Utah are grounded upon 
statutory provisions, it would appear that the three-year statute of limita· , 
tions would be by its terms more applicable. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff-
Appellant, his own statement of the facts in his brief indicates that more 
than three years expired between March 13, 1973, the date Plaintiff-
Appellant claims the cause of action arose, and November 11, 1976, the 
date he filed this lawsuit. Thus, Plaintiff-Appellant's cause of action is 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations even on his own statement of 
facts. 
II. EVEN IF THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES, 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED BECAUSE 
MORE THAN SIX YEARS EXPIRED BETWEEN THE DATE ANY CAUSE OF 
ACTION ACCRUED IN THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND THE DATE 
THE ACTION THEREON WAS COMMENCED. 
The material facts in this case are not disputed, and based upon 
the undisputed facts, the District Court properly held that as a matter of 
law Plaintiff-Appellant is not entitled to recover. The facts show that 
I 
Plaintiff-Appellant's only cause of action arose at the time of the conveyanci 
I 
of the property, in 1945, and that this action is barred even by the six-year 
statute of limitations. 
As the basis for his claim against the Defendant-Respondent, 
Plaintiff-Appellant has alleged that the Defendant-Res pond ent "breached its 
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warranties to convey fee title to the Plaintiff." (Amended Complaint, 
paragraph 8.) He further alleges that Defendant-Respondent breached the 
"warranties of title and covenants expressed or implied in the Special 
Warranty Deed." (Amended Complaint, paragraph 20.) There is no 
clarification in the amended complaint as to what specific covenants 
Plaintiff-Appellant alleges were breached, so this brief will respond as 
if it had been alleged that Defendant-Respondent had breached all of the 
warranties expressed or implied in the Special Warranty Deed. 
Section 57-1-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, sets 
forth the five statutory covenants that a properly executed Warranty Deed 
is deemed to include. Under this statute, grantor covenants as follows: 
1. That he is lawfully seised of the premises, 
2. That he has good right to convey the same, 
3. That he guarantees the grantee, his heirs, and assigns 
the quiet possession thereof, 
4. That the premises are free from all encumbrances, and 
5. That the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives 
will forever warrant and defend the title thereof in the 
grantee, his heirs, and assigns against all lawful claims 
whatsoever. 
A Special Warranty Deed includes each of these covenants, except that 
grantor only covenants that he himself has done nothing to breach them. 
In analyzing a case in which a breach of any or all of these covenants 
is alleged, it is important to bear in mind that the law does not treat each of 
these covenants the same, and the legal principles applicable to one 
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covenant may have no bearing upon another covenant. It is essential, in 
studying the case law regarding such covenants, to determine which of the 
covenants a case is dealing with so as to avoid the misapplication of impor-
tant legal principles. For example, legal principles regarding the 
covenant of seisin should not necessarily be applied to the covenant of 
warranty. 
In order to simplify the discussion, each of the covenants which 
Defendant-Respondent has allegedly breached will be discussed separately. 
Covenant of Seisin. 
The covenant of seisin is a covenant that grantor owns the estate or 
interest he purports to convey. It is breached if the grantor does not own 
the estate or interest he purports to convey. No actual eviction of grantee 
is required. 
The majority rule, with which we are in accord, is that 
there is a breach of warranty when it is shown that the 
grantor did not own the land that he purported to convey 
by warranty deed description. The covenants involved 
are of seisin and of good right to convey the property 
which for the purposes considered in this case, are 
synonymous, and the breach thereof is made out by a 
showing that those rights did not exist in the grantor, 
and it is not necessary to show an actual eviction or 
threat thereof. Creason v. Peterson, 24 Utah 2d 305, 
470 P 2d. 403 (1970). (Emphasis added.) 
A breach of this covenant occurs at the time of conveyance, if at all, for 
the grantor either has seisin or he does not have seisin at the time he i 
I 
Bernklauv. Stephens, 150Colo. 187, 371P. 2d765, makes the covenant. 
( 1962). Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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The cause of action for breach of the covenant of seisin arises at 
the time the deed is given. Anderson v. Larson, 177 Minn. 606, 225 N. w. 
902 (1929); Faller vs. Davis, 30 Okl. 56, 118 P. 382 (1911), cited with 
approval in Creason Vo Peterson. Therefore, the statute of limitations 
starts running against the grantee in a case involving the covenant of seisin 
upon the date of conveyance. If Plaintiff-Appellant alleges that said 
Defendant breached the covenant of seisin, his claim is clearly barred under 
even the six-year statute of limitations. 
It should be noted that Creason v. Peterson, which is cited by 
Plaintiff-Appellant in support of its position that an actual eviction need 
not be alleged to permit recovery for breach of the covenant of warranty, 
deals with a breach of the covenants of seisin and right to convey. The 
holding in Creason is not applicable to covenant of warranty cases. The 
opinion expressly states "The covenants involved are of seisin and of 
good right to convey the property." Although the opinion does use the word 
"warranty" in defining what constitutes a breach of the covenant of seisin, 
it appears that the court was using the word "warranty" as a synonym for 
the word "covenant." This becomes even more clear upon noting that it is 
the very next sentence that states that the covenants involved in that case 
were those of seisin and right to convey. 
Covenant of Right to Convey. 
This covenant is that grantor has the power to convey the property 
described in the deed. It is very similar to the covenant of seisin and the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Utah Supreme Court treated it as synonymous with the covenant of seisin in 
the case of Creason v. Peterson. Accordingly, this covenant was breached, 
if at all, at the time of the conveyance, and any claim Plaintiff-Appellant 
has thereon is barred by the statute of limitations. 
Covenant against Encumbrances. 
This covenant is one against encumbrances upon the property, such 
as liens, mortgages, and easements. The existence of an encumbrance 
upon the property is a breach of this covenant. The primary question 
before the courts regarding this covenant has been, When does a cause of 
action accrue for breach of the covenant against encumbrances? Soderberg 
v. Holt, supra. The Soderberg case sets forth a detailed discussion of the 
various judicial positions on this issue, which is summarized herein. The 
opinion states that traditionally the covenant against encumbrances was 
treated similarly to those of seisin and right to convey. A cause of action 
for breach of the covenant against encumbrances arose al the time of the 
conveyance, for the reason that either there was an encumbrance at the 
time of conveyance or there was not. Later, some jurisdictions revised 
this rule, holding that the cause of action did not arise until the grantee 
suffered damages as a result of the encumbrance. This revised position 
was intended to protect grantees who were not made aware of the encum-
brance until long after the statute of limitations had expired. These courts 
viewed the covenant solely as one of indemnity, giving the grantee the right 
to recover from the grantor any sums grantee had to pay as a result of the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-12-
encumbrance. 
This revised rule corrected an injustice, in that parties who were 
required to extinguish encumbrances such as liens and mortgages were 
allowed to be indemnified by their grantor at the time they were really 
damaged, that is, upon their being damnified. Unfortunately, this revised 
rule created a new injustice, in that it virtually denied grantors the pro-
tection of the statute of limitations in cases where the encumbrance was not 
a monetary charge on the land that could be extinguished, but was a perman-
ent burden on the title, such as an easement. Such encumbrances were 
generally not capable of being removed by payment of a charge, but were of 
a type that permanently reduced the value of the property, with the loss, if 
any, occurring at the time of conveyance and not later, as L'1 the case of 
monetary charges. 
Judge Cooley in Post v. Campau, 42 Mich. 90, 3 N. W. 272, 275 
(1879) drew this distinction between the two types of encumbrances, creating 
a new rule, and the Utah Supreme Court in Soderberg cited his opinion with 
strong approval and adopted his view. The Utah court felt that where an 
encumbrance not involving a money charge exists, the covenant is breached 
and the cause of action arises at the time of conveyance, because that is 
the best time to determine the damage suffered by the grantee, consisting 
of loss in value of the property. The protection of the statute of limitations 
is accorded to the grantor commencing with the date of the conveyance. 
Explaining its position, the Utah Court held: Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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In a very able opinion, Mr. Justice Cooley drew a 
distinction between encumbrances which were per-
manent and which were burdens upon the title, such 
as an easement ••• and those encumbrances, such 
as liens, which were capable of beL'lg removed at 
the option of the covenantee. The former kind, Judge 
Cooley suggested, permanently reduced the value of 
the title conveyed and thus could be ascertained as 
much at the time of the conveyance as at any future 
time, and that therefore it was reasonable to hold 
that a covenant against them was broken at once and 
finally, because the covenantee could proceed at 
once to recover full damages ••• "It is only by thus 
distinguishing between encumbrances that the covenant 
can have reasonable effect in all cases ••• 11 We 
believe that the logical fabric and the law will be 
better maintained and yet justice be done by holding 
that a covenant against encumbrances is, in effect, 
a covenant to indemnify where the encumbrance is a 
charge or lien against the land which can be extinguished 
by payment. Thus the statute can be held to begin to 
run only when the grantee is damnified. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Later in the opinion, the court discusses the similarity of circum-
stances in cases where the covenant of seisin is breached and in cases 
where an encumbrance exists which is not a money charge on the land. In 
each situation a nondischargeable encumbrance exists which permanently 
affects the title. The court states further "in such cases there is no 
reason why the statute [of limitations) should not be set in motion immediate!\ 
when the covenant is broken, because the damages for the wrong may be 
then as completely and fully adjudged as at any other time. 11 
The Soderberg rule remains the law in Utah. Thus in cases involvinr1 
I 
a money charge on property, the statute of limitations does not commence i 
until the grantee pays that charge to remove the encumbrance. But in cases'. 
I 
'1 
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like the one at bar, where the encumbrance is an easement, not involving a 
money charge, the statute of limitations commences at the time of convey-
anc''• If an action is timely commenced, the Plaintiff may recover the 
difference in value between the property with the encumbrance and without 
the encumbrance. If the action is not timely commenced, as occured in this 
case, it is barred. Plaintiff-Appellant's citation of Soderberg as holding 
that the covenant against encumbrances is solely a covenant to indemnify 
misstates the court's holding and overlooks the above distinction between 
types of encumbrances. The language in SodE:rberg stating that the statute 
of limitations begins to run only when the grantee is damnified expressly 
applies only "where the encumbrance is a charge or lien against the land 
which can be extinguished by payment." No such monetary encumbrance 
existed in our case. 
Also, since the deed to the easement was recorded in 1916, the 
public records imparted constructive notice to the Plaintiff-Appellant of 
the existence of the easement, and it becomes even more just to hold that 
his cause of action arose at the time of the conveyance. Ruthrauff v. Silver 
King Western Min. & Mill. Co., 95 Utah 279, 80 P 2d 338 (1938). The 
statute of limitations commenced in 1945, and expired long before Plaintiff-
Appellant filed suit. Any claim of Plaintiff-Appellant based on the covenant 
against encumbrances is barred, and the District Court held properly in 
granting summary judgment for the Defendant-TI espondent. 
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Covenants of Quiet Enjoyment and Warranty. 
The covenant for quiet enjoyment is that grantee will not be disturb,; 
in his possession or enjoyment of the property by a third party's lawful 
claim of title. The covenant of warranty is that grantor guarantees the 
soundness of title, and agrees to defend on behalf of the grantee any para-
mount claims existing at the date of conveyance. For all practical purposes, 
these two covenants amount to the same thing, and because the same rules 
apply to each, they are discussed here together. East Canyon Land and 
Stock Company vs. Davis and Weber Counties Canal Company, 65 Utah 560, 
238 P. 280 (1925); Van Cott v. Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 226 P. 460 (1924). lt 
is true that these covenants are not necessarily breached at the time of 
conveyance. It is also true that these covenants run with the land, although 
this does not become important in this case because there have been no \ 
subsequent grantees; the original covenantors are the parties to this suit. 
The important point with respect to these covenants in this case is 
that even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff-
Appellant, these covenants were not breached by the Defendant-Respondent. 
Therefore, no cause of action ever arose for Plaintiff-Appellant on these 
two covenants. 
The covenants for quiet enjoyment and warranty are breached, and 
a cause of action accrues in the grantee, if the grantee is ( 1) evicted (2) by 
one having paramount title. 
The general rule is to the effect that where one seeks 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-16-
to recover for a breach of the covenants of warrant 
of title, he must allege an eviction by one having y 
paramount or better title. East Canyon Land & Stock 
Company v. Davis & Weber Counties Canal Company, 
supra. 
The Utah Supreme Court has further stated that the covenant of 
warranty is a "warranty against eviction only." VanCott v. Jacklin, supra, 
citingTallmadgev. Wallis, 25Wend. (N.Y.) 115. Therefore, as a general 
rule, Utah law requires that there be an eviction of a grantee by someone 
having paramount title before a cause of action arises for breach of these 
covenants. 
It seems implicit in the above statement of the rule that, at least in 
the case of Special Warranty Deeds, that paramount title in the evicting 
party must have been in existence at the time of conveyance to the grantee, 
for two reasons. First, the grantor in a Special Warranty Deed covenants 
only that he will warrant and defend his grantee's title and quiet enjoyment 
against the lawful claims that were created by soffi2 act of his. He does not 
promise to protect against lawful claims arising subsequent to his conveyance. 
Second, it would be inherently unjust to require a grantor to protect his 
grantee against claims arising as a result of grantee's actions and not 
through any acts of the grantor, after grantor had conveyed the property, 
Accordingly, a grantee has no cause of action against his grantor on the 
covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment if he either is not evicted from 
the property, or if he is evicted but by someone claiming paramount title 
whose claim arose after the conveyance of the property. This view is Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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supported in a case cited in Plaintiff-Appellant's brief, which statc·s that: 
No cause of action arises upon the covenant of 
warranty ••. until after eviction, either actual or 
constructive, by one having an adverse or paramount 
title which existed when the covenant was made. 
Wilder v. Wilhite, 190 Kan. 564, 376 P. 2d 797 (1962). I 
I 
In the present case, Plaintiff-Appellant has no cause of action on the 
covenants of warranty or quiet enjoyment because he was never evicted , 
from the property. He alleges in paragraph 10 of his Amended Complaint th,I 
he was evicted "due to the fact that he was prevented from either mortgaging I 
or selling said property, and that said property was lost in a foreclosure 
action." This allegation does not state a valid cause of action, as the 
District Court properly held. The Plaintiff-Appellant was never evicted 
from the subject property. Rather, his interest was foreclosed by a third 
party to whom he had mortgaged the property in 1963, eighteen years after 
the conveyance of the property to him. The property was sold to satisfy 
the judgment of foreclosure, and Plaintiff-Appellant failed to redeem the 
property after the judgment sale. He was not evicted. 
Furthermore, even if this court should hold that foreclosure of a 
mortgage and subsequent sale of the mortgaged property constitutes an 
eviction by the mortgagee of the mortgagor, Plaintiff-Appellant still has no 
cause of action on the covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment against 
Defendant-Respondent. This is because he was not "evicted" by someone 
holding paramount title who held such title at the time of conveyance. If 
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rights as easement holder and had required Plaintiff-Appellant to remove his 
building from the right of way, Plaintiff-Appellant might have a colorable 
claim. Even at that, such an 11 eviction 11 would only be partial. The 
Plaintiff-Appellant doesn't allege this, and the facts show that the railroad 
had for all intents and purposes abandoned the easement. Plaintiff-
Appellant alleges only that he was foreclosed upon by his own mortgagee. 
Defendant-Respondent had nothing to do with the creation of the mortgage 
and should not be required to be responsible for Plaintiff-Appellant's 
failure to keep up his mortgage payments. In cases involving an alleged 
breach of the covenant against encumbrances, Utah law clearly provides 
that a grantor cannot recover damages for breach of the covenant by his 
grantors unless those damages were in fact caused by the breach of that 
covenant. Damages resulting from some other cause are not recoverable. 
Pacific Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Rohn, 101 Utah 335, 121 P 2d 635 (1942). 
It would appear that the same rule should apply in cases involving alleged 
breaches of the covenants of warrants and of quiet enjoyment. 
The only effect that Plaintiff-Appellant alleges directly resulted 
from the existence of the easement was that he was unable to sell or mort-
gage the property. Even if this were true, it does not allege a breach of 
the covenants of warranty or quiet enjoyment. The law does not require a 
granter to covenant in a Special Warranty deed that his grantee will later 
be able to sell the property. It only requires him to covenant that the grantee 
will not be evicted from the property by a paramount claim. V arCott v. 
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Jacklin, supra, East Canyon Land & Stock Company v. David & WebcE_ 
Counties Canal Company, supra. The cause of the Plaintiff-Appellant's 
loss through foreclosure of the property was his failure to make the 
required mortgage payments. The foreclosure was not caused by the exis-. 
tence of the easement. Since Plaintiff-Appellant has not alleged and the 
facts before the Court do not show an eviction of the Plaintiff-Appellant by 
one holding paramount title, no cause of action for breach of these warran-
ties ever arose in the Plaintiff-Appellant. 
III. THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE 
ACTION AS PLAINTIFF WAS NEVER EVICTED. 
Plaintiff-Appellant states in his brief that Utah law does not require 
an allegation of actual eviction to state a cause of action for breach of 
these covenants. He cites the case of East Canyon Land & Stock Company 
v. David & Weber Counties Canal Company, and selectively quotes language I 
in the opinion to support his view. The East Canyon case is clearly dis-
tinguished from this action and the language quoted is inapplicable to the 
facts of this case. In East Canyon, the grantor deeded property by mesne 
conveyances to the ultimate grantee by warranty deed. It was discovered 
that the grantor had not owned the land, but that title thereto was in the 
sovereign, the United States. Plaintiff sued for breach of the covenant of 
warranty, but did not allege an actual eviction. Defendant demurred to the 
complaint. The Court first clearly stated, as was discussed above, that thi 
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in order lo state a valid cause of action for breach of the covenants of 
warrants and quiet enjoyment. It then cited two main exceptions to the rule. 
First, \!/here title is in the sovereign (as occurred in that case), an actual 
eviction need not be alleged. The language quoted by Plaintiff-Appellant is 
the language of this exception to the general rule. Plaintiff-Appellant's 
statement on page 9 of his brief that the language he quotes "sets forth what 
allegations are sufficient in a breach of covenants action," misstates the 
law and makes the exception into the general rule. This exception, on its 
facts, docs not apply in the present case, where paramount title is not in the 
sovereign. 
The second exception is that where a paramount title is asserted so 
that grantee must either yield to it by leasing or purchasing the land, or 
else be evicted, no actual eviction need be pleaded if the grantee chose to 
purchase or lease the property rather than be evicted. This exception does 
not apply to the present case either, because the purported paramount title 
holder, the Defendant railroad company, never sought to "evict" the Plaintiff-
Appellant, and Plaintiff-Appellant never was put in the position of choosing 
between eviction or paying off the railroad. 
Plaintiff-Appellant also cites the case of Creason vs. Peterson, 
supra, in support of his claim that no actual eviction was required. As was 
discussed above, Creason dealt expressly with the covenants of seisin and 
right to convey, where eviction is not required. Its language is not applicable 
to cases involving breach of the covenant of warranty. 
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Plaintiff-Appellant further cites the Kansas case of Wilder vs. 
Wilhite, in support of his claim that no actual eviction was required. Tht 
Wilder case does not support Plaintiff-Appellant's argument. That case 
states with clarity, in language quoted above, the rule that an eviction is 
required to support a cause of action for breach of the covenant of warranty, 
No actual eviction was alleged in Wilder, but the Petition did allege that 
grantee had been required to engage in "extensive litigation" with a third 
party who held paramount title. The court felt that this allegation was 
sufficient to allege a constructive eviction and withstand a demurrer. The 1 
case at bar is distinguishable on its facts from Wilder, because the only 
purported holder of paramount title, the railroad company, has made no 
issue of the easement and has never sought to enforce it against Plaintiff-
Appellant. There has been no litigation whatsoever between Plaintiff-
Appellant and the railroad over the railroad's right to the easement. It 
should be noted that the court liberally construed the Plaintiff's pleading in 
Wilder, because its sufficiency had never been challenged by the Defendant 
on motion, and this fact affected the court's decision. In the present case, 
1 
Plaintiff-Appellant has filed both a Complaint and an Amended Complaint, i 
neither of which state a cause of action, and he should not be entitled to any 
such liberal treatment. This view is supported in Faller v. Davis, supra, 
cited approvingly in Creason v. Peterson. 
Under applicable Utah Law, thereforic, an eviction of Plaintiff-
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cause of action could arise in Plaintiff-Appellant for breach of the covenants 
of warranty and quiet enjoyment. 
CONCLUSION 
Because any claim that Plaintiff-Appellant may have had for breach 
of the covenants of seisin, right to convey, or against encumbrances is 
barred by even the six-year Statute of Limitations, and because no cause 
of action ever arose in the Plaintiff-Appellant for the breach of the covenants 
of warranty and quiet enjoyment, the District Court ruled properly in 
dismissing the Complaint. The Defendant-Respondent respectfully requests 
that the decision of the District Court be affirmed on this appeal. 
Respectively Submitted 
McKAY, BURTON, THURMAN & CONDIE 
By~~~~-=-=~:---:-;-.,.--~~~~~~­
Wilford M. Burton 
Blaine R. Ferguson 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent Utah-
Idaho Sugar Company (U & I, Inc.) 
500 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: 521-4135 
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